On Apr 22, 2009, at 7:38 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote: > On Wednesday 22 April 2009 02:09:21 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote: >> So we get to the question, what a freenet contact is: A friend or an >> aquaintance. >> >> If you look at myspace and similar sites, you'll see people with >> hundreds of >> "friends" which in truth are aquaintances. >> >> Also the question arises, which number of friends will be efficient >> for >> freenets algorithm: How many people have similar interest? > > In terms of routing, the main issues are: > - There must be a small-world network. Clearly random automatically > selected > participants will not form a small-world network, but acquaintances > probably > do. I repeat, randomly selected people through any automated > mechanism WILL > BREAK ROUTING!
Are we even sure of that??? I know that the whole routing algorithm is based on small world theory. However, if we load up a sim of a large randomly connected network, would freenet not operate on it? Perhaps it would sort out effective and usable locations anyway (simply on graph theory)? BTW, like you, I am NOT in favor of making any such random/automatic darknet connections. I think the general question is: How does increasing the cardinality effect the network? Presuming that all nodes are currently running at throttled speed, then surely it could only effect routing. - It might make a request get out of an overloaded 'clump' faster (around backed off peers/but most of my peers are not backed off). - It dilutes both relevant (friend) and irrelevant (IRC) darknet links. From a free-software standpoint, if someone really wanted to have more than 20 connections, why-would/how-could we stop them? If it is so popular a request, how would a few super-connected nodes negatively effect performance/network? Just make it an obscure/advanced option. > - There must be enough of them online at a time that there is a > viable, > routable network. Right... better with more connections, I suppose. > In terms of security: > - Darknet is much more secure than opennet simply because the cost > of getting > a connection to the target node is much higher. This greatly reduces > the > effectiveness of mobile-attacker source tracing attacks, one of the > most > serious known attacks. > - Clearly you are vulnerable to your peers. But no more so on > darknet than on > opennet, really. On opennet, it is possible to get many connections > to the > target; on darknet, you have to persuade the user to give you such > connections by e.g. pretending to be many people. > > So IMHO unless you have serious security requirements there is no > reason not > to connect to acquaintances. I agree. Unless your acquaintances are a bunch of snoops and hackers (you know... those sort that use freenet) :) -- Robert Hailey -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20090422/7c5881bd/attachment.html>