On Friday, July 06, 2012 08:24:16 PM Franck Martin wrote: > So when you have so many policies to choose from, it is better to remove > ambiguity and as DMARC is built on top of SPF and DKIM and more recent, > then best to ignore the policy components of the underlying protocols.
This worries me as a sender. All I want from DMARC is the feedback bit. As it stands, SPF works very well for my use case (small domain sending to a modest number of receivers who only very rarely use transparent forwarding). I am, however absolutely NOT a candidate for any kind of DMARC policy other than monitor. In my last DMARC report from Google, kitterman.com listed 3,130 messages from 136 IP addresses. 100% fail the SPF portion of DMARC due to lack of alignment (the are all either web generated or email lists). Only 7 of 3,130 had a DKIM signature survive and be aligned. Absolutely none of those messages would have been rejected due to my -all SPF record. None of those messages were abusive as far as I can tell from the provided information. A DMARC monitor policy should mean precisely that. Monitor and provide feedback. Trying to tell people to ignore my SPF record because I also have a DMARC record that says not to do anything is just wrong. If people don't want mail rejected due to SPF or ADSP, then they shouldn't publish DNS records inviting that. DMARC absolutely should not change that. If it does, then I don't want to do anything with it. Scott K _______________________________________________ dmarc-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://www.dmarc.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc-discuss NOTE: Participating in this list means you agree to the DMARC Note Well terms (http://www.dmarc.org/note_well.html)
