On Saturday, October 24, 2015 4:54 AM [GMT+1=CET], Scott Kitterman via 
dmarc-discuss wrote:

> On October 23, 2015 8:37:06 PM EDT, John Levine <jo...@taugh.com>
> wrote: 
> > > From a DMARC perspective, if you know the sender is trustworthy,
> > > you do a local override.  ARC doesn't
> > > seem to be needed for that.
> > 
> > I have many of the same questions you do, but it is my impression
> > that a surprising number of lists behave fine for a long time, then
> > some bad guy starts pumping spam through it by impersonating one of
> > the subscribers.
> > 
> > ARC should be helpful in that perhaps non-exotic situation.
> 
> Could be.  I certainly don't claim it's not potentially useful.  My
> concern is that it seems to be marketed as a solution to the DMARC
> mailing list problem and as far as I can tell, its potential utility
> is orthogonal to that.

Ok, you said "from a DMARC perspective, if you know the sender is trustworthy, 
you do a local override". But imagine big ESP "A" with hundreds of thousands of 
users who may subscribe to all kinds of mailing lists of which mailing lists 
you --as big ESP "B"-- had no previous knowledge and on which you have no 
a-priori trust.

In that scenario, when you as big ESP "B" receive email from such mailing lists 
addressed to your users, you don't know whether the sender (i.e., the mailing 
list) is trustworthy because you didn't know anything about him until now, so 
you cannot do a local override of DMARC in an automated and safe way.

But if the big ESP "A" user sent a DKIM signed message to that list, and that 
list added a ARC seal to the message when it forwarded said message to the 
list's subscribers, then you --as big ESP "B" and as recipient of said 
message-- could verify that it is true that said user from big ESP "A" indeed 
sent that original email addressed to the list, and if the ARC chain is 
verifiable and goes back to someone you trust then you could begin to put some 
trust also in the other end of the ARC chain (on its latest iteration), and 
therefore do a local override of DMARC in an automated and safe way even with 
email received from senders your didn't know were trustworthy.

Am I too off base?

Regards,
J.Gomez


_______________________________________________
dmarc-discuss mailing list
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org
http://www.dmarc.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc-discuss

NOTE: Participating in this list means you agree to the DMARC Note Well terms 
(http://www.dmarc.org/note_well.html)

Reply via email to