J. Gomez writes: > I think we are not talking about the same thing: when I said > "depends on DMARC's success", I meant "depends on DMARC's success > as an implemented technology in the real world", whereas it seems > you understood "depends on a successful DMARC check".
No, we are talking about the same thing. What I am saying is that DMARC is already a "success as an implemented technology in the real world" by any reasonable standard, because it *does* work for exactly the transactional mail flows you worry about. And it is possible to *prove* that it does work by looking at the properties of checks for individual messages. On the other hand, DMARC and similar technologies *cannot* solve the problem of spam and other abuse by those with whom you've had no previous relationship. That's easy to prove too: anybody with access to a DNS server can add DMARC and DKIM records and sign their mail. Mailing lists (among other indirect mail flows) do have problems interacting with DMARC, and it's worth trying to solve those problems. But they are not going to reverse DMARC's success. > I know that DMARC is not the silver bullet. If you know that, I do not understand how you can classify DMARC as anything but a success. I'm an MLM developer; I hate p=reject with a passion. But I can't deny that for the vast majority of mail, DMARC works as advertised, p=reject included. _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
