Tony Finch <[email protected]> wrote: > Amelia Andersdotter <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> I have difficulties seeing how a user (within the meaning of individual >> internet consumer) has any practical choice to other than to share PII >> with a DNS provider? > > Yes, me too.
There’s always the option to run your own recursive, possibly even on your own machine. In the latter case, it even becomes a practical option for non-technical users. In this case, the discussion about privacy between recursive and authoritative becomes much more important since it becomes easier to link the information leaked to the authoritative to a specific user (well, device). But then, how much information do you leak, really, to a individual authoritative? I’ve been meaning to do a proper privacy analysis of the possible option for a user’s DNS setup. Which of these leaks the least amount of information and, as a result, is there any measures that can be taken to leak even less? I have a sense that the gut feeling assessments that people often do (“Just run your own Unbound on a private server”) may not actually hold up. Not sure if such an analysis is relevant for this particular work, but it may still be useful to do as part of this working group. > Since the overall topic is recursive -> authoritative, the questions imply > some mechanism for the user to communicate their privacy policy to the > recursive server, or perhaps it would be more useful for clients to ask > the recursive server what its policies or capabilities are. But what > happens when there is a mismatch? I’m not sure such capability announcement is useful. It can help with making a decision when automatically picking a recursive -- but then you can’t actually put too much trust in it because it easy to claim whatever and, since automation hides the decision, hardly anyone will ever check. Essentially, you will have to make a trust decision for a particular recursive service. There may be technical means to support this, but these need to be off path and operated by independent third parties. Kind regards, Martin _______________________________________________ dns-privacy mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
