> On 7 Nov 2019, at 00:17, Christoph <[email protected]> wrote: > > Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:> * "A DNS privacy service must be engineered > for high availability." >> I'm not in favor of this sentence. 1) It seems to despise small >> resolvers managed by small organisations, while we need many diverse >> DoT and DoH resolvers, to avoid centralisation 2) Today, Firefox, >> unfortunately, does not allow to add more than one DoH resolver, >> which makes the DoH resolver a very critical resource. But I hope >> that in the future, we will be able to configure several resolvers, >> with an efficient fallback, making the issue of availability less >> important. > > I second that. > >> “A DNS privacy service should strive to engineer encrypted services >> to the same availability level as any unencrypted services they >> provide.”? > > Sounds good to me.
Thanks. > >> * DROP is not a perfect acronym > +1 > maybe "DROPS”? Right now it is ‘DNS Recursive Operator Privacy’ statement. I think if we added ’Security’ (as I think you are suggesting) then I suspect a comment would be that it should include a lot more than it currently does if it is to cover all aspects of ’security’ because that is a broad term…... > >> "be held only memory" > > "in memory.." Fixed! Sara. _______________________________________________ dns-privacy mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
