Mikael, On Oct 15, 2016, at 11:22 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
These kinds of migration scenarios to newer algorithms MUST be hashed out, because otherwise we're never going to be able to deploy new algorithms (and per previous experience, it seems we want to change them every 5-10 years). Agreed! To capture this kind of information, a group of us wrote a draft in DNSOP about new crypto algorithms: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-york-dnsop-deploying-dnssec-crypto-algs-01 In section 2.1.1 we mention the situation with resolvers and unknown algorithms. However, we assume compliance with RFC 4035. Your case study here shows that we need to add some text about the challenge that can happen if the resolver does the wrong thing and fails the validation. I'll add that. Thank you for bringing this case to the list. It seems to me there is a larger issue of whether a system will "fail insecure" (or "fail open") or "fail secure". RFC 4035 has the "fail insecure" view where the DNS info is still passed along, thus allowing the deployment of new algorithms to NOT break things, although with a lower level of security until the new algorithms are supported. It seems the dnsmasq developers chose to "fail secure" thus potentially "protecting" the end user from insecure data, although in this case the data is secure, just not understood to be secure. This is one of the tougher points of algorithm change, particularly when so many of the resolvers may be in commodity customer-premises equipment (CPE) that may or may not be easily updated or replaced. Dan -- Dan York Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> +1-802-735-1624 Jabber: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Skype: danyork http://twitter.com/danyork http://www.internetsociety.org/
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