In message <>, Dan York writes:
> Mikael,
> On Oct 15, 2016, at 11:22 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson
> <<>> wrote:
> These kinds of migration scenarios to newer algorithms MUST be hashed
> out, because otherwise we're never going to be able to deploy new
> algorithms (and per previous experience, it seems we want to change them
> every 5-10 years).
> Agreed! To capture this kind of information, a group of us wrote a draft
> in DNSOP about new crypto algorithms:
> 01
> In section 2.1.1 we mention the situation with resolvers and unknown
> algorithms. However, we assume compliance with RFC 4035. Your case study
> here shows that we need to add some text about the challenge that can
> happen if the resolver does the wrong thing and fails the validation.
> I'll add that. Thank you for bringing this case to the list.
> It seems to me there is a larger issue of whether a system will "fail
> insecure" (or "fail open") or "fail secure".
> RFC 4035 has the "fail insecure" view where the DNS info is still passed
> along, thus allowing the deployment of new algorithms to NOT break
> things, although with a lower level of security until the new algorithms
> are supported.

No.  RFC 4035 is "fail secure".  Not supporting a algorithm is not a

> It seems the dnsmasq developers chose to "fail secure" thus potentially
> "protecting" the end user from insecure data, although in this case the
> data is secure, just not understood to be secure.

No. The dnsmasq developers just stuffed this up.  No rational
developer of CPE equipement would do this deliberately as there is
no way to upgrade every piece of equipment before deploying the new

> This is one of the tougher points of algorithm change, particularly when
> so many of the resolvers may be in commodity customer-premises equipment
> (CPE) that may or may not be easily updated or replaced.
> Dan
> --
> Dan York
> Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society
><>   +1-802-735-1624
> Jabber:<>
> Skype: danyork

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