Draft: draft-wagope-dnsop-do-bit - "Clearing the DO bit for DNSSEC" <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wagope-dnsop-do-bit/>
Some of us were chatting at the recent ICANN meeting about impediments to adoption of PQC algorithms in DNSSEC. One of the big concerns is that PQC signatures will almost certainly cause a fallback to TCP, and this may cause significant load issues for both authoritative and recursive servers. While only something like 40% of resolvers worldwide perform DNSSEC validation, because of the way the DO bit works, all recursives request this data, whether they need it or not. This draft updates[0] RFC4034 - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions" <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4034/> to recommend that recursive resolvers only set the DO bit if they, or their clients, are validating. This does mean that the resolver will need to track how the data entered it's cache, and will have to additional queries if an incoming query with DO arrives for an cache entry which was populated without DNSSEC info. This trades complexity and additional queries for less TCP fallback. The authors cannot figure out if this is the best idea ever, or the worst idea ever, but we wanted to share it and get your feedback. Warren, Peter and Geoff. — [0]: More correctly, this draft will be updated to update RFC4034 if the WG decides that the idea is worth pursuing. I had some initial OLD / NEW text, but I pulled it out to keep the initial version short and readable (and because the draft-cutoff arrived faster than expected, and I didn't have time to tidy it up more :-) )
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