I'm also completely opposed to this proposal, and am in full agreement with
Ted, Joe, and Paul.

If a resolver calls itself DNSSEC validating or DNSSEC aware, it needs to
properly fulfill the responsibilities associated with that role.
This design was enshrined (correctly in my view) a long time ago. To quote
RFC 3225 (not 4034), Section 3:

   A recursive DNSSEC-aware server MUST set the DO bit on recursive
   requests, regardless of the status of the DO bit on the initiating
   resolver request.  If the initiating resolver request does not have
   the DO bit set, the recursive DNSSEC-aware server MUST remove DNSSEC
   security RRs before returning the data to the client, however cached
   data MUST NOT be modified.

While I'm generally open to architecturally sound proposals that help
reduce response sizes, this isn't one of them.

For the motivating case of PQC signatures, I think we need to accept that
larger scale use of TCP (or QUIC) will happen, and need to plan our
infrastructures accordingly.

Shumon

On Sat, Oct 31, 2026 at 8:31 AM Ted Lemon <[email protected]> wrote:

> 200% agree.
>
> As for the DO bit, it should always be set, because we should always be
> validating. Asking people not to set it if they aren't validating is
> planning for failure. No.
>
> On Fri, Oct 30, 2026, at 11:51 PM, Joe Abley wrote:
>
> Hi Warren,
>
> On 30 Oct 2026, at 23:33, Warren Kumari <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This draft updates[0] RFC4034 - "Resource Records for the DNS Security
> Extensions" <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4034/> to recommend that
> recursive resolvers only set the DO bit if they, or their clients, are
> validating.  This does mean that the resolver will need to track how the
> data entered it's cache, and will have to additional queries if an incoming
> query with DO arrives for an cache entry which was populated without DNSSEC
> info. This trades complexity and additional queries for less TCP fallback.
>
>
> My opinion is that the DNS needs less UDP, not more of it. I am not in
> favour of band-aids that prolong the tolerance of transport protocols that
> constrain response sizes.
>
> I think we should be doing everything we can to move the mainstream to
> (ideally encrypted) stream-based transport protocols which have no response
> size constraints beyond those of the DNS message format, transport
> protocols that have no need for protocol modifications of the kind you
> describe above.
>
> The future of UDP transport should be best-effort support for legacy
> devices.
>
>
> Joe
>
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