> On 31 Oct 2026, at 12:30, Ted Lemon <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> As for the DO bit, it should always be set, because we should always be
> validating.
No. There are plenty of use cases where DNSSEC validation isn't needed or
wanted: armies of dumb IoT devices that have feeble CPUs and die when their
batteries run flat, stub resolvers using encrypted transports that are
considered "good enough", enterprise networks that can't/won't drink the DNSSEC
Kool-Aid, etc. Foisting (unwelcome) validation that's doomed to fail in these
scenarios isn't going to have a happy ending or lead to the universal
deployment of DNSSEC.
You're also redefining the meaning of the DO bit. It was introduced to signal
to a server that the (stub) resolver understood DNSSEC related RRtypes => it
wouldn't fall over if those RRtypes were included in a response. RFC3225 says
nothing about validation at all. If this matters, I suppose we can always burn
another EDNS header bit to say "I [don't] do DNSSEC validation".
BTW early versions of BIND9 always set the DO bit. Even when the name server
wasn't configured with a trust anchor or wasn't linked with a crypto library to
do validation. This was unwise IMO. Let's not continue setting the DO bit no
matter what. Just use it for its intended purpose.
> Asking people not to set it if they aren't validating is planning for failure.
Maybe, maybe not. If someone isn't validating - for whatever reason - why
bother setting the DO bit on their outbound queries? What's gained by doing
that? How would flooding resolvers with unwanted RRSIGs and so on encourage DNS
admins to turn on DNSSEC?
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