On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 7:03 AM Philip Homburg <[email protected]> wrote:
> The tension between draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-alg-rules and > draft-jabley-dnsop-local-signing-algorithm-policy got me thinking. > > What draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-alg-rules tries to do is to allow different > signers for a single zone to sign with different algorithms. In the future > we > could have a situation where for a single zone, some signers sign with > ECDSA > and others sign with a PQC algorithm (or ECDSA plus PQC). > > What draft-jabley-dnsop-local-signing-algorithm-policy proposes is that if > a zone seems to be signed with a PQC algorithm (especially if there a DS > record > with a PQC algorithm) then legacy (quantum-unsafe) algorithms are to be > ignored. Combining there two drafts is likely to result in validation > errors. > I think we will definitely need to think through this issue as we work on the multi-alg-rules draft. PQC signature deployment will very likely necessitate algorithm downgrade protection rules in DNSSEC, but I don't think those rules should take the form proposed in jabley draft, which unilaterally privileges PQC only algorithms. I prefer a more general signaling scheme of the form you have proposed, though I was thinking of classes of algorithms (PQC and Classical) rather than individual algorithms. [...] Another use case goes in the opposite direction: hybrid schemes. A zone > signed with both PQC and ECDSA could set the ZSA bit on both a PQC and > an ECDSA key. That allows paranoid validators to insist in verifying both > the PQC and the ECDSA signatures. The advantage is that the effective > strength is the strongest of the two algorithms. > Yes, I think this is an important use case that I feel the DNS community has not paid enough attention to yet. Some prominent cryptographers strongly suggest not deploying PQC-only KEMs or signatures (see this note for example https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/C5yAJ-4XGIrNuqoIQAy5Auimos0/). And indeed TLS only standardized a hybrid KEM. Shumon.
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