Hi again, On 15 Nov 2026, at 14:21, Philip Homburg <[email protected]> wrote:
> As far as I know, the following two statements are true: > - with draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-alg-rules it is allowed to have a zone > where some signers sign the zone with ECDSAP256SHA256 and other > signers sign the zone with ECDSAP256SHA256 plus ML-DSA-44. > > - with draft-jabley-dnsop-local-signing-algorithm-policy, when a validator > implements the policy described in the draft and receives an RRset signed > with just ECDSAP256SHA256, it concludes DNSSEC bogus. > > That leads me to conclude that these two draft are in conflict: large > scale implementation of one of these draft would make the other > draft impossible because it would lead to DNSSEC bogus results. Oh, I see what you mean, now. A response that only includes signatures from the P-256 signer would be identified as an attack by a validator that wants to protect against ML-DSA-44 signature stripping. Your ZSA idea also wouldn't help in this scenario: if an ML-DSA DNSKEY has ZSA=1 and one signer only signs with P-256 then the RRSIGs generated by that signer only will be insufficient for a validator that includes the ZSA logic. > But maybe I'm wrong and I misunderstood the drafts. > > I support the goals of both drafs. It is just that as far as I can tell, > as the drafts are written today, they cannot co-exist. Presumably they can co-exist if zone administrators choose their signing algorithms appropriately and avoid the case where one signer doesn't sign with a PQ-safe algorithm while others do. Maybe this is just a more general PQ consideration (as the sole case we care about today that has downgrade concerns) and not something that multi-alg-rules needs to care about. Joe _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
