> Oh, I see what you mean, now. A response that only includes signatures > from the P-256 signer would be identified as an attack by a validator > that wants to protect against ML-DSA-44 signature stripping. Your > ZSA idea also wouldn't help in this scenario: if an ML-DSA DNSKEY > has ZSA=1 and one signer only signs with P-256 then the RRSIGs > generated by that signer only will be insufficient for a validator > that includes the ZSA logic.
This case ML-DSA DNSKEY records should have ZSA=0. > Presumably they can co-exist if zone administrators choose their > signing algorithms appropriately and avoid the case where one signer > doesn't sign with a PQ-safe algorithm while others do. Maybe this is just a more general PQ consideration (as the sole case we care > about today that has downgrade concerns) and not something that > multi-alg-rules needs to care about. The idea is that ZSA can be used to signal to the validator whether downgrade protection would work (ZSA=1 on at least on PQC DNSKEY) or potentially break something (ZSA=0 on all PQC DNSKEYs) _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
