I can understand the idea that ADoX trades latency and reliability for privacy and security, and resolver operators may be hesitant to make that trade without consulting the clients. Accordingly, I can see the appeal of an opt-in signal from the client. However, I doubt that this draft represents the best approach.
This draft implies that a single resolver instance performs both ADoX and non-ADoX queries to the same authorities. This creates a huge number of complications. For example, some insecure records may be present in cache that were fetched previously over UDP. Should they be refetched over ADoX to prevent forgery, even though this reduces privacy? What if they are only the glue records for a signed child zone? What is the privacy response status of a query whose recursive stages used a mix of cached and uncached, secure and insecure, ADoX and non-ADoX queries? What about QNAME-minimized queries that only reveal a TLD? Should queries with EDNS Client Subnet be treated as more sensitive in some way? It seems to me that the four proposed privacy-request levels are just a handful of the zillions of plausible policies, and their semantics are far from precise. Operational practice from Quad9, 1.1.1.1, and NextDNS suggests a different way to expose these choices: by offering different resolver identities with different behaviors. This gives operators the flexibility to choose whatever combination of behaviors they believe will be useful, and gives users a menu of possibilities without requiring changes to applications and operating systems. I would love to see public resolver operators offer a "strict ADoX" resolver option, as a bridge to a world where that is the expected default, but I don't think we should define a signal for this in the query. On the response side, I do agree that we may need an ADoX equivalent of the "AD" bit, but I don't foresee a need for more than one bit of signal (meaning "this response is fully authenticated by some combination of DNSSEC and ADoX"). --Ben On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 1:29 PM Leon Fernandez <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > Hello DNSOP! > Me and Valentin have come up with a suggestion for how a DNS client can > signal to a recursive > resolver a preference for what transports should be used during resolution. > This is one piece of > the larger puzzle of enabling encrypted authoritative DNS (a.k.a. ADoX). It > is intended to > work alongside existing work on ADoX such as RFC 9539, transport signaling > with DELEG and > the so-called OOTS-approach (which we are also engaged in). > > Datatracker: > https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fernandez-dnsop-client-side-adox-signal__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!7BxTUyVVpQG-qb8lGU70D9p7nci4ZWcg2t4CpC1sgSA-qQCegDZ6eENBh7_wIqaaACl-m7hbjsU2yEEKwQfnOiY2I44$ > > Any feedback is much appreciated! > > // > Leon Fernandez > Research Developer > The Swedish Internet Foundation > > +46 76 050 89 77 > > https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://internetstiftelsen.se/en/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!7BxTUyVVpQG-qb8lGU70D9p7nci4ZWcg2t4CpC1sgSA-qQCegDZ6eENBh7_wIqaaACl-m7hbjsU2yEEKwQfnJieGXY8$ > > Visiting address: Hammarby Kaj 10D, Stockholm, Sweden > Mailing address: Box 92073, 120 07 Stockholm, Sweden > _______________________________________________ > DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
