I can understand the idea that ADoX trades latency and reliability for
privacy and security, and resolver operators may be hesitant to make
that trade without consulting the clients.  Accordingly, I can see the
appeal of an opt-in signal from the client.  However, I doubt that
this draft represents the best approach.

This draft implies that a single resolver instance performs both ADoX
and non-ADoX queries to the same authorities.  This creates a huge
number of complications.  For example, some insecure records may be
present in cache that were fetched previously over UDP.  Should they
be refetched over ADoX to prevent forgery, even though this reduces
privacy?  What if they are only the glue records for a signed child
zone?  What is the privacy response status of a query whose recursive
stages used a mix of cached and uncached, secure and insecure, ADoX
and non-ADoX queries?  What about QNAME-minimized queries that only
reveal a TLD?  Should queries with EDNS Client Subnet be treated as
more sensitive in some way?

It seems to me that the four proposed privacy-request levels are just
a handful of the zillions of plausible policies, and their semantics
are far from precise.  Operational practice from Quad9, 1.1.1.1, and
NextDNS suggests a different way to expose these choices: by offering
different resolver identities with different behaviors.  This gives
operators the flexibility to choose whatever combination of behaviors
they believe will be useful, and gives users a menu of possibilities
without requiring changes to applications and operating systems.

I would love to see public resolver operators offer a "strict ADoX"
resolver option, as a bridge to a world where that is the expected
default, but I don't think we should define a signal for this in the
query.

On the response side, I do agree that we may need an ADoX equivalent
of the "AD" bit, but I don't foresee a need for more than one bit of
signal (meaning "this response is fully authenticated by some
combination of DNSSEC and ADoX").

--Ben

On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 1:29 PM Leon Fernandez
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> >
> Hello DNSOP!
> Me and Valentin have come up with a suggestion for how a DNS client can 
> signal to a recursive
> resolver a preference for what transports should be used during resolution. 
> This is one piece of
> the larger puzzle of enabling encrypted authoritative DNS (a.k.a. ADoX). It 
> is intended to
> work alongside existing work on ADoX such as RFC 9539, transport signaling 
> with DELEG and
> the so-called OOTS-approach (which we are also engaged in).
>
> Datatracker: 
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fernandez-dnsop-client-side-adox-signal__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!7BxTUyVVpQG-qb8lGU70D9p7nci4ZWcg2t4CpC1sgSA-qQCegDZ6eENBh7_wIqaaACl-m7hbjsU2yEEKwQfnOiY2I44$
>
> Any feedback is much appreciated!
>
> //
> Leon Fernandez
> Research Developer
> The Swedish Internet Foundation
>
> +46 76 050 89 77
>
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://internetstiftelsen.se/en/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!7BxTUyVVpQG-qb8lGU70D9p7nci4ZWcg2t4CpC1sgSA-qQCegDZ6eENBh7_wIqaaACl-m7hbjsU2yEEKwQfnJieGXY8$
>
> Visiting address: Hammarby Kaj 10D, Stockholm, Sweden
> Mailing address: Box 92073, 120 07 Stockholm, Sweden
> _______________________________________________
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