Focusing on one issue for a moment. On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 12:08 AM Joe Abley <[email protected]> wrote: > Fetching over ADoX does not provide integrity protection; even if you > authenticate the server you connect to (which might well be complicated) you > need DNSSEC to validate the integrity of the response.
I disagree. If I operate a local full resolver, and perform all recursive queries over authenticated, integrity-protected connections, then I can be sure of the data's integrity even if the zone is not DNSSEC-signed. (This is the position advanced in draft-rescorla-dprive-adox-latest, although that proposal is outdated.) > > On the response side, I do agree that we may need an ADoX equivalent > > of the "AD" bit, but I don't foresee a need for more than one bit of > > signal (meaning "this response is fully authenticated by some > > combination of DNSSEC and ADoX"). > > I don't think I understand what you mean by this. Are you saying that > resolvers should no longer validate but should instead trust authority > servers to assert that validation is not necessary? No, not in general. I am saying that there appear to be some clients that today make use of the "AD" bit (because they presume a secure connection to a trusted resolver) [1][2]. If we intend to support this arrangement, then I believe we should extend it with some signal to indicate ADoX-based authentication. (We could even just overload the AD bit, but I suspect that would not have consensus.) [1] https://sha256.net/VerifyHostKeyDNS.html [2] https://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#:~:text=delegates%20DNSSEC%20validation%20to%20the%20operating%20system%27s%20configured%20recursive%20DNS%20nameserver > Earlier you suggested that four was too small a number to enumerate the > privacy options in Leon's draft, but here you seem to say that one bit is > sufficient to cover all the combinations of DNSSEC validation, secure > transport and certificate validation requirements? I am referring here to the response, not the request. The request is attempting to express a policy preference, but the response has a much simpler job: to indicate whether the data could have been poisoned. --Ben _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
