> > Good question! I personally think a resolver should refetch the data > > it has in the cache that does not live up to a client's request for STRICT > > privacy. > > OK, then I misunderstood what you had in mind for this. > > My assumption was that the client is expressing requirements for > how the resolver will process cache misses. If there's no cache > miss, there's no special handling required.
If an attacker has control over a resolver's cache then a timing attack is possible. If we go down that path then ultimately every client would need it's own cache. However, nothing ties such an attack to a specific value of the option or to the option at all. So my preference would be a document that describes the intent of the client and leaves out exactly how a resolver would meet the requirements. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
