I've been trying to avoid having a linguistic and philosophical debate on ECOLOG, having no formal background in either subject, but it looks like the debate is inevitable. Very well.
Matt writes, "We say species are invading because we mean to be pejorative, not merely descriptive". That's partly true -- "exotic" is the more neutral term -- but to call the usage pejorative isn't quite right, either. "Invasive" refers to either an exotic that's spread rapidly and/or widely, or an exotic that causes effects we don't like (i.e. harm). Despite the casualness of my initial email -- and I certainly hope ECOLOG is an appropriate forum for casual usage! -- I used that word quite deliberately as I think it's appropriate in this situation. My rejection of the claim that the word "invasive" is anthropomorphic has nothing to do with what a person may be described as doing. I used the example of describing a person as "successful" to reject the claim that calling a species "invasive" ascribes an intrinsic characteristic to it. On the other hand, Matt rejects my "invasive cancer" example as being relevant to the issue of whether the word "invasive" may be used without anthropomorphism. Why? Species aren't cancers, but the question is one of anthropomorphism, not non-neutrality. Blaming a snake or fungus for something would be silly, but ascribing causality is not the same thing as assigning blame. If we say, "HIV causes AIDS", "a tsunami caused the meltdown at Fukushima", or "solar flares cause communication satellites to malfunction", are we blaming the HIV virus, tsunami or solar flares? If not, why the emphasis on fungi not being moral actors? As for "appropriating" your point about causality, Matt, it's called agreeing with you! "X causes Y" ALWAYS implies a particular background; in this case, a background of human knowledge and practices relating to truffles. To take the classic example, striking a match doesn't cause a fire if oxygen is absent, but this doesn't mean we can't say that striking a match caused a particular fire. Similarly, Tuber indicum causes certain problems in France. (And yes, this was my original meaning.) Finally, Matt writes, "The presence of two superficially similar (to casual inspection) fungi in the same place doesn't cause concrete harm. It may violate someone's sense of place or require them to learn to differentiate between the two". And why do they have to learn to differentiate between the two, assuming this to be possible without microscopic or molecular analysis? To avoid economic harm! Just because you can compensate for a change doesn't mean it wasn't harmful. Otherwise, you could say that someone who lost a leg in an accident and got a good prosthesis wasn't harmed. Matt, you and I agree that the exotic species issue is overblown and often badly handled. (Yes, everyone has their favorite horror stories, but most exotics AREN'T harmful.) But I don't think it's helpful to completely deny that the issue exists. Jane Shevtsov On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 9:52 AM, Matt Chew <[email protected]> wrote: > The dust has settled a bit, so it's time to respond. > > Jane Shevtsov raised some interesting points in her rebuttal of my analysis > of her post. Most of them further exemplify the conceptual confusion and > questionable communication practices I was highlighting. > > First, she reminded us: "I was speaking casually" Of course she was, and > obviously so. Why, having admitted to speaking casually, try to defend it > as if that casualness had formal underpinnings? It any case it is a poor > justification. Does 'casually' mean carelessly, vaguely, imprecisely or > misleadingly? Is this an appropriate forum for casual remarks? For that > matter, should any conversation between ecologists about the objects we > study be shorthanded either ambiguously or misleadingly? > > Jane's based her rejection of anthropomorphism primarily on what a person > may do or be described as doing. That underlines my point. Truffles > aren't persons. Appealing to the fact that "doctors may speak of invasive > cancers" doesn't have anything to do with whether truffles can invade or > species are invasive. (Species aren't cancers, although that broad > metaphor of reflexive fear and loathing has been applied to them as well.) > > Appealing to "what we often say" hardly implies that what we often say has > been well said. Ecology's 'house' of casually applied metaphors (see > Science 301:52-53) accumulated like a woodrat midden. It's stable the way > any heap of miscellaneous material can be stable, but it isn't much of a > structure. > > Volition is important because invading is purposeful. Invading isn't a > synonym for diffusing or dispersing or being moved along a gradient or by > an applied force. We say species are invading because we mean to be > pejorative, not merely descriptive. It's a revealing category error. > > Any research project that has ever set out to compare 'natives' to > 'invasives' (there are MANY such) carries a "casual" tacit presumption that > those twp categories are ecologically meaningful. They aren't (see Chew > and Hamilton's 'The Rise and Fall of Historical Nativeness…). That's why > the results of those studies are broadly inconsistent. So yes, Jane, > research has been significantly undermined. It's not a problem of comparing > apples and oranges. It's a problem of comparing mermaids and hippogriffs. > > In her rebuttal Jane appropriated my point about causality and suggested it > was her own. Hardly so. She (originally, casually) claimed truffles were > causing a problem. > > Finally, Jane wrote "One of the reasons I highlighted this article is that > it describes > concrete harms arising from an exotic species…" But it doesn't do that. > The presence of two superficially similar (to casual inspection) fungi in > the same place doesn't cause concrete harm. It may violate someone's sense > of place or require them to learn to differentiate between the two. Change > is not harm. Demanding the world to conform to prior expectations or > beliefs (especially while expecting to be able to manipulate it to one's > own advantage) seems naive. > > David McNeely doesn't like brown tree snakes or Phytophthora ramorum. He > casually failed to contextualize either. Charitably assuming that he meant > brown tree snakes on Guam, and further assuming that by social damage he > meant the climbing instincts of brown tree snakes are incompatible with the > way people have traditionally strung electrical wiring, we still can't say > the snakes caused a problem. David apparently assumes that humans should > be free to do things the way they always have even when newly prevailing > conditions render those habits ineffectual. Eradicating brown tree snakes > on Guam may or may not be possible. Changing the way electricity is > distributed is an engineering exercise. Doing the same thing over and over > while expecting different results indicates the usual results are actually > more acceptable than the costs of adapting. > > David's "ecological damage" to Guam was caused by humans acting on naive > and tacit expectations that a remote island could be industrially > militarized—with all the coming and going that entails—without > fundamentally and practically altering its connectivity to other > ecosystems. Guam has been only hours away from many islands and several > continents since the 1940s. Focusing on brown tree snakes and blaming them > for happening to have survived inadvertent transport there seems > intentionally myopic. Calling them invaders when they are evidently > established and occupying virtually all usable habitat on the island is > another category error. > > The advent of P. ramorum in North America produces effects more troubling > to more people than than power outages or ecosystem restructuring on Guam. > But P. ramorum is doing what it always has, necessarily without reference > to continents or forests or even trees, for that matter. Fungi aren't > moral actors and they aren't morally accountable. If a P. ramorum spore > arrives in suitable habitat (on, but without awareness of a tree) it grows > and reproduces. But that isn't invading, or it shouldn't be—to an > ecologist. This may be one of the most important points in this > discussion. It doesn't take an ecologist to anthropomorphize the advent of > a taxon we don't like by labeling it an invasion. Anybody capable of > noting and disliking the arrival—for any reason, or no articulable reason— > can do that. It doesn't explain or even describe the event in other than > personal, subjective terms. Ecologists need to do better, and > differently, than everyman, or else 'ecologist' becomes a category error, > too. > > Matthew K Chew > Assistant Research Professor > Arizona State University School of Life Sciences > > ASU Center for Biology & Society > PO Box 873301 > Tempe, AZ 85287-3301 USA > Tel 480.965.8422 > Fax 480.965.8330 > [email protected] or [email protected] > http://cbs.asu.edu/people/profiles/chew.php > http://asu.academia.edu/MattChew -- ------------- Jane Shevtsov, Ph.D. Mathematical Biology Curriculum Writer, UCLA co-founder, www.worldbeyondborders.org "In the long run, education intended to produce a molecular geneticist, a systems ecologist, or an immunologist is inferior, both for the individual and for society, than that intended to produce a broadly educated person who has also written a dissertation." --John Janovy, Jr., "On Becoming a Biologist"
