From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 01:04:39 +0000
Ken Johnson wrote:
As I understand it, the main problem with CR is that it is strategically equivalent to Approval.
I reply:
That might be a problem to those who don't like Approval. But to those of us who like Approval, CR's strategic equivalence to Approval isn't a problem. It's what makes CR one of the best methods.
...
Mike Ossipoff
Mike,
I was, until recently, a fanatical advocate of Approval. I tried to demonstrate by empirical simulation the superiority of Approval over rank methods, based on the criterion that the election method should maximize "social utility" as defined by sincere CR. (See my earlier post in Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #597, Message 4.) Unfortunately, it didn't turn out the way I expected. In a single-issue election with many candidates, Approval exhibited abysmal performance, worse than all other methods (including Plurality). So I gave up my crusade. Oh well.
Ken
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