Forest Simmons wrote: > > Someone (Kevin or Bart or both) recently reminded us that the usual > version of Cumulative Voting is strategically equivalent to Plurality. > > However the recent proposal allowing both positive and negative votes with > the sum of absolute values limited, is different: it turns out to be > strategically equivalent to a method that (like plurality) allows only one > mark, but that mark can be either positive or negative, i.e. you can vote > for a candidate or against a candidate, but not both.
Ahh, I see that now. I think someone had pointed this out earlier, but I wasn't following closely enough at the time. In that case, given the sincere ratings of: A(1.0) > B(.99) > C(.98) > D(.97) > E(0) my IRNR ballot would be something equivalent like: A(0) > B(-.001) > C(-.000001) > D(-.000000001) > E(-1.0) The idea is the same, to choose values which keep the bulk if my voting power focused on a single choice regardless of elimination order. So ratings still aren't necessary for optimal strategy; you could just rank the candidates but allow the value of each vote to be positive or negative. Thus: E(neg) > A(pos) > B(pos) > C(pos) > D(don't care) I concede that this method may be an improvement over IRV (which isn't saying much), but probably suffers from most or all of the same theoretical defects. Bart ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
