>>2. Immunity from second place complaints. Unlike in MinMax and >>Beatpath, the DMC winner always defeats the candidate which would win >> if the winner were not present. > --nice. Also true of range.
I'm sorry you're wrong here: If ballots are voters A points B points 60 60 40 40 0 100 then B wins although she is obviously defeated by A, the obvious 2nd place winner. ---I'm sorry but YOU are wrong here. Your precise wording was "always defeats the candidate which would win if the winner were not present" Range voting obeys your precise wording, using the precise range votes with the winner deleted from those votes. ---more general rant: I am rather annoyed when I see Condorcet advocates claiming that range voting is not a Condorcet method, but then by the precise definition they provide of "Condorcet method", range voting is a Condorcet method. Then they complain that it is *I* who has the wrong definition, or oops, they made a mistake (more rarely). But in fact, range voting is a Condorcet method by many of the precise wordings of defintions of "Condorcet method" given by even the most diehard of flaming Condorcet advocates, and this is a case in point. The whole issue that the definition of "Condorcet" really is two (or even three) inequivalent definitions, is discussed in http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/CondDefnQuibble wds ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info