Dear Warren! You wrote: > but in range's case it is particularly self-evident.
Right, I could have seen that myself, sorry. > --Also, now that I understand DMC has two kinds of monotonicity property, I > must report my admiration. Why? Many Approval/Condorcet-hybrids are monotonic in both senses. > DMC however exhibits "no show paradoxes" where > voting for A top cuases A to lose, and if you had instead not voted, A would > win. This is something like a monotonicity failure (although technically > not > one). Range voting in contrast is both monotonic and never exhibits > a no-show paradox, so in that sense range voting is superior. Agreed. Most Condorcet methods violate mono-add-top as they violate later-no-harm. But at least adding a truncated ballot with a first preference only is monotonic. Yours, Jobst _________________________________________________________________________ Mit der Gruppen-SMS von WEB.DE FreeMail können Sie eine SMS an alle Freunde gleichzeitig schicken: http://freemail.web.de/features/?mc=021179 ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
