On Mon, 29 Aug 2005 11:01:21 -0700 Araucaria Araucana wrote:
On 28 Aug 2005 at 17:19 UTC-0700, Warren Smith wrote:
--(also true of range)
I'm a bit worried here. Heitzig was telling me DMC could be done with
equality rankings
like A>B=C>D=>F too. However... in the plain Condorcet world, permitting
equalities
*and* using winning votes makes a big difference and you need to do *Both*
to reap the benefits. So I would like to know how DMC handles that, in view
of the previous remark 9 that DMC eliminated the margins/winnign
votes debate.
There are those who maintain that when candidates are equal-ranked,
each should get half a vote. As far as I can tell, all those who
support this position are marginal-votes proponents.
SOMEBODY does not understand - what I see:
With margins the difference in counts between A and B matters - and
adding half a vote to each has no effect on the margin.
I argue for adding the half votes with AV - which I back and where
they do make a difference.
If approval cutoff is implemented using an extra fictional
Not-Approved candidate, with votes "for X against Not-Approved"
counted as approval, then the half-vote-split equal-rank tabulation
artificially inflates X's approval rating. X might then avoid being
eliminated (in DMC) by a truly higher approved candidate.
In my winning-votes-biased opinion, equal ranking should be considered
as an abstention in the contest, tabulated as *no* vote for either
candidate. As it happens, this Does The Right Thing on an approval
cutoff ballot, no extra gimmicks required.
What I say above fits with my belief that two votes for A=B should have
the same effect as one vote each for A>B and B>A (neither of these show
voter intent to abstain. On the other hand, truncation is deliberate
abstention).
Furthermore, ER-half-vote-split loses information. Once the totals
are accumulated, you can no longer tell how many equal-rank votes were
cast. But that information is still available directly from the
pairwise matrix if you use ER-equals-abstention:
(X=Y) = total - (X>Y + Y>X)
where
(X=Y): total number of equal ranks
total: total number of ballots
X>Y : total number of ballots ranking X over Y
Y>X : total number of ballots ranking Y over X
Shouldn't a voting method try to avoid entropy, rather than increasing
it? :-)
I get lost in this last paragraph. I need an entry in the array for A>B,
and one for B>A. With truncation these do not add up to total ballots.
Do you want a half an array to count explicitly A=B. I do not see it as
valuable enough to keep around, and simply fold into A>B and B>A.
Q
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
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If you want peace, work for justice.
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