This continues my reply to the remarks that equated majority rule to Nazi rule. For one thing, the extreme or dangerous groups are unlikely to have a majority, though it could happen. But more often majority rule is a moderating influence. And so it's highly misleading to identify the majority with people who want to put people in gas ovens. As I said, one reason why majority rule is important to me is that a majority can get its way anyway, regardless of the method. It can do so by strategy. IRO & Margins require the kind of strategy that I call drastic defensive strategy. Several people agree with me that it's desirable for a voting system to encourage honest voting. Then it's especially desirable for a method to not force the especially insincere practice of voting a less-liked alternative equal to or over a more liked one, in a ranking election. Do you really want more than half the voters to have to play strategy games, and rank Clinton above Nader, even though they like Nader best? Just in case you're part of that more-than-half, as you would be if Nader voters + Clinton voters add up to a majority, wouldn't it be best not to impose drastic strategy requirements on majority-size groups? We can avoid that with the VA methods. But with Approval we can at least avoid the need to vote Clinton _over_ Nader, as you'd often need to do with IRO or Margins. Mike
