At 02:30 PM 10/13/98 EDT, you wrote:
>The relative rankings of the methods to produce a Condorcet Winner (CW) are
>apparently--
>
>1. Condorcet
>2. Approval
>3. Bucklin (sum votes at choice levels, 1st, 2nd, etc.)
>4. Runoff (top 2)
>5. Instant runoff (drop lowest repeatedly)
>6. Plurality

If your goal is to produce a (CW) this is obviously correct.
But its not obvious what the goals are that's why the meta
election.

When things like simplicity, secrecy and honesty become
goals Approval gets a big push. For example ranked ballots
can be used to sign ballots violating secrecy.




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As the complexity of a system increases our ability to make
precise and yet significant statements about its behavior
diminishes until a threshold is reached beyond which precision
and significance or relevance become almost mutually exclusive
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