This idea just popped into my head, which means I haven't thought about it
in much detail.  I'm pretty sure someone has already come up with this.
Anyway, voters have three different ways they can vote for candidates -
dissaprove, approve and strongly approve.  Then, conduct a pairwise count,
where for a pairwise comparison on each ballot;

If both A and B are strongly approved, they each get 1 point
If A is ranked over B, A gets 1 point and B gets 0 points
If both A and B are approved, they each get 1/2 point
If both A and B are dissaproved, they get 0 points

You then use Ranked Pairs (WINNING VOTES) to tabulate the winner / ranking.
With this score structure, you're much more likely to get a Condorcet
winner.

I haven't investigated criteria compliance.  It probably doesn't violate FBC
and monotonicity.  There are probably clone problems, but I'm not sure how
serious they might be.

Thoughts?

Craig

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