Lying again, are we?. From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Sun Aug 26, 2001 11:14 am Subject: Re: [EM] Three Tier, Dyadic via CR, etc. > >We were launched on this particular search of elimination methods >satisfying the Condorcet Criterion by a desire to fix IRV in a way that >would be palatable to the same folks that now support IRV. > Perhaps the search will find nothing. Mr Simmons is giving an aim of finding something that does not exist. It would help here if Mr Simmons would comment on (1) monotonicity and (2) that property of STV that has the win-lose state of a given candidate, unaffected by changes after (and not including) its preference. Will (2) be lost and (1) worsened?. The word "fix" seems plain enough to me, but I presume that their it is, to the degree it is not undefined, an ideal of making IRV somehow worse. One problem IRV people may have is that they sense goodness with less perceptiveness than government officials can. It is like a black universe that this list's typing monkeys could start to fill: what is there in Condorcet that can make any method appear to be better to an individual voter that wants a method to be free of obviously dogy/wrong behaviour. What happens here is that chat lasting for years results in no complete consideration of the 3 candidate problem. We could say that all of the 9 or 15 paper simplex that holds all 3 candidate methods has to be searched through. Mr Simmons used the word "search", but perhaps the simplex won't be searched at all. The search was restricted to elimination methods and I presume that that is a extreme restriction that imposes bad properties except that increase information flow between stages can make a method with more stages than candidates be a method that has the 2 numbers comparable. An elimination method is one that removes all vertices of a candidate in a single step. That can be an extremely large number of vertices that vanish in a single step. It is remarkable constraint and not one that is natural (but it is a known idea), and factorising is something that is naturally done. Suppose the IRV people say that the improvement has to be so great that the perhaps quite wrong restriction prevents the attaining fo the improvement of a size that is large enough?. How do you choose these constraints (i.e. 'a method shall have stages where elimination of k candidates occurs'), Mr Simmons?. I presume that Mr Simmons can't produce a plot for the papers (AB), (B), (C), or for (AB), (A), (B), (C), that shows that there is any reason to imagine the pairwise comparing style ideas will be of use in improving IRV. It has been the history of this list to consider ideas that can't make it past the simplest 3 candidates tests. Mr C. Layton's "Fluffy the Dog" example seems to pose a problem for people that could see Condorcet as plausible, What about pairwise comparing's ability to properly implement vote bartering and perhaps bribing, in hierarchies of factions in elections with hundreds of candidates. Does someone want to tell us how restricting consideration to only 2 candidates at a time, could possibly allow the method to properly simulate the real power disputes between votes representing factions of candidates, with each faction having at least 100 candidates. Who said the comparing had to use summing to subtotals when there was truncating after just 2 candidates and that is done for all nc * (nc - 1) / 2 combinations. The readers of the list might be able to regards the lists prolific pro-Condorcet idealists (Schulze, etc.) as part of a community of monkeys in a zoo. All that steel that locks them in (in the picture) could not have a correspondence with any outer world because Condorcet gets rejected. >We're going to have to simplify eventually if we want this journey to >end up there. ... Simplify which equations, Mr Forest Simmons?. Given the problem with disagreeable statements and no equations about anywhere, what is needed by Forest Simmons would be a lot more complexity in the exact treatment and transformations of the quantifier logic rules. Perhaps subscribers have their own beliefs about rules (like aquarium fish) and they could put on show. These fish would be shaping the course of civilisation that is exhibited inside cities and it would be nice to see what the rules exhibit. IS there a consensus that the fish that would say "right number of winners" is missing from so many people's collection of axioms, that the list can agree that methods that pick the wrong numbers of winners are OK. To not make "right number of winners" an axioms makes the mathematics very much more complicated. >Comment: > ... >That's one reason why we have to pit the minmax loser against the >Copeland loser: i.e. to make sure we don't eliminate the CW if there is >one. > >Unfortunately Copeland elimination by itself is not good enough to >guarantee the Ranked Pairs winner in a three way contest. > At 01.09.04 13:32 +1200 Tuesday, Craig Carey wrote: > > >Mr Forest Simmons wrote this. Since [he] was not replying to my request >for information privately I have rejoined to ask the question in this >list. What exactly is the equation of this concept called "FBC" ?. ... FBC was never defined by Mr Ossipoff. Usage of it could involve a tariff before the far side of a better method could arrived at.
