Dear Rob, of course, this IFPP generalization also violates the monotonicity criterion. When 3 CABD voters are changed to ACBD in your example, then the winner is changed to C. Situation 1: 10:A>B>C>D 15:B>A>C>D 23:C>A>B>D The quota is 12. A and D are eliminated in the first round, then B beats C. Situation 2: 10:A>B>C>D 15:B>A>C>D 20:C>A>B>D 3:A>C>B>D D is eliminated in the first round. In the second round, the quota is 16 so that A and B are eliminated and C wins. Markus Schulze
- [EM] IFPP for more than three candidates? Rob LeGrand
- Re: [EM] IFPP for more than three candidates? Markus Schulze
- Re: [EM] IFPP for more than three candidates? Markus Schulze
