At 01.09.19 09:13 -0700 Wednesday, Forest Simmons wrote: >The following message may be of interest to EM list readers: > >Forest > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2001 23:52:51 -0700 >From: Fillard Rhyne <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: FairVoteOR <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: [FairVoteOR] Eugene > >The unofficial final results for the City of Eugene ballot measure, >from <http://www.co.lane.or.us/Elections/20010918.htm>, are 34.3% >in favor of preference voting and 65.6% against. > >Fillard The CVD is still promoting the use of a truly defective method. At least that seems to be the latest thinking of Rob Richie who _still_ was pushing the IRV ios good enough to actually use opinion. At 2001.05.28 20:06 +1200 Monday, Craig Carey wrote to instant-runoff-vote: Knowledge held by the CVD: > > > We are particularly knowledgeable about: ... 3) the option of > > > instant runoff voting ... We believe it is essential to consider > > > voting system reforms that could reinvigorate American politics > > > >http://www.fairvote.org/about_us/index.html ... A programmers version of the CVD method, the US state "invigorator's" first fish mallet: > > > > procedure IRV(BallotsVec) return set is > > begin > > if pub closing and no hand of cards > > return (all meta-suites of poker bits; > > else V2:=elim wee-est and back to table and shuffle hand and > > return best IRV (BallotsVec); > > end if; > > end IRV-worlds-best-method; > > > >That is 4 SLOCS (semicolon-ed lines) long. ... The Gang of 9 was running an anti-IRV campaign. The anti-IRV cartoons are dated 2 Sept 2001 to 3 days ago (17 Sept), and they are here: http://www.thegangof9.com/past_cartoons.phtml They were implying that IRV is too complex. It is nonmontonic. It may have too many faces. I guess the CVD want to believe that the gang of 9 was being unfair by saying IRV was too complex. Eugene is a rather small city region. It would be better if the CVD could promote less dumb unfair methods than IRV and be less disliked presumably. I saw this detail. The CVD mathematician and webmaster concedes the IRV can be 'manipulated'. Manipulation was not well defined, but that can be overlooked. Here is the text: "Multi-winner STV is even tougher to manipulate than one-winner STV." It is in paragraph no. 5 of the footnotes section, in http://members.aol.com/loringrbt/l_lor1.htm Manipulated means buggy and fixable I suppose. I write to Mr Loring from time to time, but I do not get a reply. The CVD probably does not want any of its mathematicians talking to any other mathematician. Otherwise communications over IRV could occur. Pity about failing to get the votes needed in Eugene to introduce a wrong-winner-picking method that is approx 4 SLOCs in primordial complexity. ------------------------------------------------------- Here is another Hitler-Stalin example from Demorep where the middle candidate of the 3 has the middle candidate right on the 1/3 quota. That is able to lead to a total rejection of the argument by those that saw the argument of casting 2 shadows, that is in http://www.ijs.co.nz/quota-13.htm It is controversial to have 33 votes for B and 99 votes. That is done in this example. The conclusion below (unless there is not one) is not assisted by having controversy. Possibly no other subscribers here would make that exact mistake. At 01.09.19 03:43 -0400 Wednesday, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >Back to the past- > >34 ABC >33 BCA >32 CAB > >99 > >Who, if anybody, has 50 YES votes (with 2 or more info bits per vote) ??? > ... That example does not use any "<" symbols which seems nice. There does not seem to be a good argument there, Demorep. -------------------------- Here are some examples from a private message I wrote. I was attempting to show that IRV has a vote splitting problem just like FPTP. The examples are not clearly showing that. This is one of the few areas that IRV can seem better in. (A type of test it performs quite badly in, is testing to see if it is "fair" (to individuals).) > ------------------------------------------- > AB 0 > AC 35 a = 35 > B 33 b = 33 > CA 14 c = 32 > CB 18 > > Eliminate C: > > A 35+14 = 49 > B 33+18 = 51 > > FPTP: A wins > IFPP: A wins > AV: B wins > ------------------------------------------- > > > ------------------------------------------- > AB 0 > AC 39 a = 39 > B 31 b = 31 > CA 10 c = 30 > CB 20 > > Eliminate C: > > A 39+10 = 49 > B 31+20 = 51 > > FPTP: A wins > IFPP: A wins > AV: B wins > ------------------------------------------- > A was going to give votes for C and C was partially intending to give votes to A. With IRV, winner B gets picked. That seems to be the wrong winner if a legal idea of fairness is held. Here is a simple version of the cascading of dominoes out of a stairwell and up to the highest levels of democracy. > > ------------------------------------------- > AB 0 > AC 49 a = 49 > B 26 b = 26 > CB 25 c = 25 > > Eliminate C: > > A 49+0 = 49 > B 26+25 = 51 > > FPTP: A wins > IFPP: A wins > AV: B wins > ------------------------------------------- > PS. Mr Schulze wrote that IFPP is not monotonic, but the example was not testing IFPP. Instead a not yet explicitly defined 4 candidate method was tested. IFPP is defined to be monotonic (and to pass other tests). G. A. Craig Carey
