One way to reduce the likelihood of a runoff election while keeping conventional elections is to adopt the 40% rule used in New York City's mayoral primaries: http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011010/pl/politics_newyork_dc_2.html
In NYC the top candidate only needs 40% of the vote to avoid a runoff. Makes sense to me, since 40% is no more arbitrary than 50%. I would gladly accept a strong plurality over a manufactured majority. Bart Anthony Simmons wrote: > > >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >> Subject: [EM] IRV vs Plurality Vote with a Runoff > > >> Does the fact that IRV uses a preference ballot, > >> instead of a repeated ballot, make it less manipulatable? > > >> Whatever you believe the answer is, can you prove it by > >> example or argument? > > Well, about a year ago, maybe a little less, there was an > election in Queensland, Australia, for state legislators. > One party, One Nation, wanted another party, the Liberals, to > swap preferences (you recommend that your voters put us down > as second preference and we will do the same for you). The > Libs refused. In response, One Nation withheld their > preferences from the Libs. I don't know how much effect that > had, but in Queensland, the Liberals are now the Ghosts of > Elections Past. As I recall, they didn't even get enough > votes to remain an official party in Queensland. > > Anyway, I can see how preference swapping would work > differently in two-round runoff than in IRV. You can indeed > swap preferences in two-round runoff, but it only makes sense > after the first round, while IRV requires parties to make > their recommendations before the first round.
