Another non-simple method that is simple enough to use in committees (as well as in the other contexts we mentioned for non-simple methods):
Each voter submits a Demorep style ballot. [These ballots indicate both (relative) preference order and "absolute" approval/disapproval.] The Condorcet Winner wins (if there is one). If no CW exists, then both the pairwise matrix and the approval scores are made public. In the next round each voter is allowed to adjust his/her approval cutoff up or down by one position (without changing the preference order). The candidate with the highest new approval score wins. [end of description of method] Comments: This method is similar to Demorep's ACMA (Approval Condorcet Most Approval). The extra step on the end allows the voters to make a strategic adjustment of their "absolute" approval/disapproval marks to compensate for lack of accurate polls, etc. Limiting the size of the adjustment makes it harder to manipulate the system. The original Demorep ballot summaries provide enough information about voter (strength of) preferences to allow voters to adjust their approval ballots intelligently. If secrecy is needed, the up/down adjustment is made by specifying "up" or "down" on a slip of paper bearing some (voter supplied) PIN number to be matched with the (voter supplied) PIN number on the original ballot. In large scale applications the ballot totals can be aggregated at the local level (since both Approval and pairwise methods are effectively summable). So the PIN numbers would only have to distinguish small numbers of voters (i.e. they wouldn't have to be globally unique). Forest
