Richard Moore wrote: > A full analysis through game theory might be interesting. But what types > of strategic cooperation need to be considered? I can see that an analysis > would be feasible if cooperation within factions is allowed (there would > be 46x31x26 combinations to consider, an easy task for a computer), but > if cooperation between factions is to be considered, it would be extremely > complicated.
Here's another way to think about this: Suppose faction A makes some assumptions about the probability distributions of the 31 possible (strategically sensible) ways the B faction can vote and the 26 possible ways the C faction can vote. For each of the A faction's 46 possible mixes (ranging from 45 A, 0 AB to 0 A, 45 AB), they could then calculate the expected utility and choose the one mix that maximizes that expectation. This choice clearly will lower the expected utilities of at least one of the B and C factions. But if the "victim" faction anticipates this, they could gain by choosing a strategy contrary to what the A faction assumed. It reminds me of the stock market, where it often pays to use a contrarian strategy. But that doesn't work when everybody is a contrarian, does it? -- Richard
