First of all, I thought the response of Adam Tarr was excellent. Second, to Mr. Davison:
>From what I've seen there is something to be admired in the CVD. They were founded by an important presidential candidate, they seem to have chapters in many states, and they seem to be up on legislative developments. This suggests some amount of organization and effort. Since I share their general goal of improved election methods, and respect them as an organization, it seemed reasonable to contemplate joining (although I have since decided to save $15). I never thought "If I join they'll have to change." I simply thought "Maybe if many people who share most of their goals join and work with them, in the ensuing exchange of ideas either the CVD folks will decide that other methods are superior, or they will raise a point that will cause IRV opponents to reconsider. Either way, in that marketplace of ideas only good can result." Second, you are quite condescending towards anybody who has decided IRV is not the ideal method (although I would definitely take it over plurality, and vote for it without hesitation if such a ballot initiative came up). I won't try to persuade you that Condorcet is superior to IRV, but I will suggest that from any rational standpoint it is a reasonable method with motivations quite similar to IRV: Both methods have majoritarian criteria. IRV sees who can survive a series of elimination rounds and come out with a majority. Condorcet looks to see who can survive a series of one-on-one mathups and win a majority each time, or at least select among those who win a majority "most of the time" (make it to the inner-most unbeaten set). Even if you believe that IRV is superior, Condorcet is hardly a naive, immature method. It is a reasonable proposal for holding a series of contests, and we can debate on a variety of grounds which is superior. Before I go: I'm working on making yesterday's post on power in voting blocs more rigorous. Look for a post in the next week or so. Alex Small
