On Mon, 4 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote (among other words): > > I think that it is worth comparing methods that do not require ranked > ballots and methods that do require ranked ballots on separate > planes. Since methods that do not require ranked ballots tend to be very > easy to implement, understand, and tally, they have a significant advantage > when pushing for reform on a small scale. > > In single winner, this means basically approval voting or plurality > voting. Are there any strategic advantages to plurality in this comparison? > > In multi-winner, there are a wide variety of methods that don't need ranked > ballots. I prefer open party list; some prefer closed party list or single > non-transferrable vote. Plurality at-large is a pretty poor method by > almost all accounts. >
I wonder if you have thought about Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) that we have explored on this list from time to time as an alternative to STV PR. It seems to have some of the same kinds of advantages over STV that Approval has over IRV including, of course, the simpler ballot, but not including polynomial summability. So like STV it has to be limited to situations where summability is not an important consideration. One of the best things about it is the way it rewards candidates that appeal to groups having overlapping interests, or from the other point of view, awards all groups with at least their fair quota of representation and groups with overlapping interests with extra serendipitous satisfaction. This tends to elect representatives with broader support than those elected under STV, even though they may not have as many first place preferences. As you say it is hard to make direct comparisons between methods based on Approval Ballots and Methods Based on ranked preference ballots. The standard approach is to start with sincere Cardinal Rating ballots, and then try to deduce the Approval and Preference Ballots for comparison purposes. Any other approach tends to give meaningless results in most cases. If you are interested in PAV I could point to some messages in the archives or give you a brief outline. My initial interest in joining the list was in PR methods since I considered the single winner case adequately resolved by Approval and/or Condorcet. But I was surprised at the complexity of some of the single winner issues and became fascinated by IRV psychology, etc. because of the IRV initiative here in Oregon. Forest
