On Wed, 18 Sep 2002, Adam Tarr wrote in part:
> [Bart wrote in part] > > But then I don't see truncation as necessarily a bad thing. If > > truncation can defeat a "hated middle" candidate, it addresses my main > > misgiving about the Condorcet methods. > > Much in the same way that we can't differentiate between the indifferent > voter and the lazy voter, we cannot distinguish between the "respected (if > unglamorous) compromise middle" and the "hated (yet still) compromise > middle". Smart CBA voters in an approval election will still approve B, to > defeat A, anyway. What method would actually prevent B from winning when > the voters act in a logical manner? Even plurality and IRV encourage CBA > voters to dump C for B if they have perfect information. > Relative to the "hated compromise." In a zero information election Approval would give a better result. In a perfect information election Approval would pick the CW. So in a partial information election (somewhere in between the above two cases) why would we expect Condorcet to give a result so superior as to justify the added complexity of the method? Forest ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
