Counting unranked candidate pairs
as zero votes each, Bart's example results are:
wv ABC mar ABC
C T
NT T NT
B T A/C B
A/C A
A NT B
B C B
Where A/C is a tie. Both ABC
and CBA either gain nothing or lose by truncating
(for both wv and margins) given that
A/C and B have equal utility. Adam's claim
survives Bart's challange.
If you give the unranked pairs 1/2
vote each then the wv result becomes identical to
the margin result as shown above. My conjecture is: If you give multiple
unranked candidates 1/2 vote each then both wv and margins have the no
strategic truncation incentive (NSTI) property. If, as I maintain, there is no
overall disadvantage to giving 1/2 vote each to multiple unranked candidates, and if
my conjecture is correct, then there is no basis for claiming that this NSTI property
favors wv over margins.
