My conjecture is: If you give multiple unranked candidates 1/2 vote each then both wv and margins have the no strategic truncation incentive (NSTI) property.
Sorry matt, it's not true. If you give equally ranked candidates half a vote against one another (which, I think, is what you are suggesting), then you effectively turn winning votes into margins. This is, more or less, what margins does. The reason you see no truncation incentive in this example is just because this particular example has no truncation incentive. Try this example (which I call "my standard example" because it has proven so illustrative). Sincere preferences are as follows:
49%: George>Al>Ralph
12%: Al>George>Ralph
12%: Al>Ralph>George
27%: Ralph>Al>George
Al is the Condorcet winner. If the George voters truncate in a margins method (or winning votes with half votes for and against equal ranked candidates), then George wins the election. Try it out.
-Adam
