On Fri, 17 Jan 2003, Alex Small wrote: > Forest Simmons said:
> >> > >> >66 A>B>C > >> >34 B>C>A > > No need of giving weights to see all the mischief that could come from > > giving the win to B. > > Moreover, if candidate C weren't there then we'd all agree that A trounced > B conclusively. Then we throw in C, and because the A voters happen to > agree that B is better than C, that point of agreement costs them what was > a decisive victory. And since C is not in the Smith set, this shows that even in a cycle free example, Borda doesn't satisfy even the local version of IIAC. Note that C is the unanimous loser in the ballot set considered equivalent by Saari (after adding and subtracting "symmetries"): 32 ABC 34 BAC So all methods satisfying the Pareto Criterion would agree that C is irrelevant. Yet when C is removed, the two "equivalent" reduced ballot sets yield opposite answers. ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
