On Thu, 2005-12-08 at 17:10 -0800, rob brown wrote: > I am going to guess a few things: > > 1) that it will be extremely rare that it does not find a Nash > equilibrium in fewer than 20 rounds
Here's an example where it will never resolve: Voter 1: A: 100 B: 40 C: 0 Voter 2: A: 45 B: 0 C: 100 Voter 3: A: 0 B: 100 C: 60 A simple Condorcet cycle. Let's say it starts at 50 as the approval margin. The total is then: A: 1 B: 1 C: 2 So, C will win, but Voter 3 can get a better option with a lower margin. So we then downrate his vote...similarly voter 1 can get a better option by lowering his margin, so in the next round of tabulating we get: A: 2 B: 2 C: 1 This one won't resolve. Ever. > 2) that the results of this will be remarkably similar to the results > obtained by some of the better Condorcet methods Might want to make sure it's deterministic first. Thanks, Scott Ritchie ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
