On Thu, 2005-12-08 at 18:40 -0800, rob brown wrote: > Well, your example is not only a Condorcet cycle, but a pure 3-way tie > in condorcet terms. > > It is effectively: > A>B>C > B>C>A > C>A>B
Then make it 5 A>B>C, 4 B>C>A, and 3 C>A>B, and watch the same thing happen. > > So, no condorcet method could resolve it either as anything but an > out-and-out tie. (right?) I would not expect this to do so either -- > at least not in its simplest implementation. In fact, I'm pretty > happy that it indeed met my prediction of behaving similarly to > condorcet methods, in that it gets stumped on the same data sets. :) > Your method IS a Condorcet method. If there is a Condorcet winner, and your method doesn't select him in one round, then a majority of voters can have their threshold altered such that he wins. Thanks, Scott Ritchie ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
