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Hello list
I haven't been paying much attention to this list lately. I recently
received a private e-mail from Chris Benham suggesting that I should look at the
following paper by Brahms and Sanver
I was surprised to find that the PAV (preference approval voting) method
described is identical to something called Ranked Approval that I posted to this
list 18 months ago.
I went off this method because of its vulnerability to strategic voting and
later no harm failures.
Take the following example under Ranked Approval/preference approval
voting:
41: A
44: B>A
5: C>B
10: C
A is the only candidate approved by a majority of voters and therefore the
winner.
If the 44 B>A voters approve only B the votes are now:
41: A
44: B
5: C>B
10: C and B is the winner as the most approved candidate.
David Gamble
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