At 10:45 AM 12/20/2005, James Gilmour wrote: >This is very interesting, especially with regard to the election of >"assemblies" (used here as a generic word for >councils, state legislatures, parliaments, etc) operating within a >"representative democracy". At which level should >the consensus operate? Should the consensus operate among the >voters? Or should be consensus operate within the >elected assembly?
First of all, an assembly election by consensus *is* possible in certain special cases. But it generally requires a deliberative process wherein the electing group comes to agree on its representative. There is, however, another method for creating a representative assembly where every member is elected by a form of consensus, and that is proxy representation; I'm thinking in particular of delegable proxy, and members of the assembly having different voting powers in the assembly. Asset Voting (which is actually a form of delegable proxy operating under special rules) is a technique for accomplishing something approaching this where the assembly members may have equal voting power. Delegable proxy is simpler and more direct, but there might be other reasons to prefer Asset Voting. >A voting system that sought to maximise the consensus among the >voters might well result in the exclusion from the >elected assembly of representatives of some smaller, but significant >groups of voters. Those voters would then have no >voice in that assembly. It could. However, delegable proxy has the opposite effect, especially if *voting* rights in the assembly are not restricted; i.e., the general membership may vote in the assembly (but not debate or enter motions except by permission). Thus the narrowing function of forming an assembly still functions, but individual voters remain able to be represented or, in fact, to vote directly. This is Direct Democracy with Delegable Proxy, it is, in fact, what beyondpolitics.org is currently working on. > On the other hand, if the consensus is to operate within the > assembly, the aim of the voting >system could well be to maximise the diversity of representation >elected to the assembly, so that the greatest number of >significant views might be directly represented. Delegable Proxy accomplishes this to the maximum extent possible, I believe. Full rights in the assembly, when it became necessary, would be restricted to those members who represent a minimum number of members. Note, however, that this restriction is subject to approval by all the members, and could be changed, or suspended, by them at any time. At least in theory. This is another advantage, by the way, of variable voting power, for it becomes possible to set the minimum number much lower that it would be set at with equal representation. I've considered schemes where the assembly size is set at a certain number, and, then, those in attendance who are the N most-highly-trusted proxies would have full rights. I'd assume that there would be a certain fluidity to this; but the idea is to keep full participation to a manageable number. The minimum number represented could be *much* less than the total number of represented members divided by N. Below that any proxies or sole members present would function through proxies with full rights. > If there is any parallel with the AA example, it is a consensus within >the assembly, not a consensus among the voters. While this is largely true, in theory, at least, delegates to the AA General Conference are chosen by a process which is not exactly consensus but which does generate greater minority representation than simple majoritarian elections would accomplish. Essentially, a 2/3 vote is required to elect a delegate, according to the published materials. If after repeated balloting, no single delegate obtains a 2/3 vote, the delegate is chosen by lot, I think from among the top two. Another way of accomplishing something even more broad, overall, would be a lottery system where *all* candidates were included in the lottery, with the chance of winning being proportional to the vote cast for the candidate. (Simply collect the ballots and draw one out of the box....) With a large delegate body, this would produce broad minority representation. But delegable proxy is much simpler and practically guarantees broad representation. Essentially it avoids elections entirely, or at least it avoids elections for representatives. Officers may still be elected. Further, delegable proxy, if the proxies are collected on a personal level (which I would strongly encourage, and, indeed, this is one of the reasons for "delegable" proxy, to make the collection of proxies on a small scale possible while still keeping high concentration of representation in large organizations), will function as a bi-directional communications system, where coordination and cooperation happen in a give-and-take. I'm working on a local application in a small New England town, Town Meeting government, and I've seen how substantial back-and-forth is necessary to develop a town consensus for new initiatives. Delegable proxy could speed that up and make possible broader effective participation. Note that the application would be for a Free Association, not for the town government itself. But if a well-connected FA comes into being, it could effectively become the hand that guides the official government, through advising the voters *and* the town. > I appreciate one has to accept the opposite conclusion in respect of >single-winner elections (city mayor, state governor, etc), where you >have no option but to look for consensus among the >voters. Frankly, to my mind, systems of government based on single-winner elections are a formula for an eventually weakened sense of ownership on the part of the public. Few of us now think of the government as "us." It's "them," and, mostly, we don't trust "them." Politician is right up there with Used Car Salesmen, my apologies to used car salespersons. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
