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Suppose:
ABC: 9
ACB: 0
BCA: 5
BAC: 0
CAB: 16
CBA: 0
A>B = 25 v.s 5
B>C = 14 v.s 16
C>A = 21 v.s 9
"C" is a clear winner.
But suppose that only two "ABC" strategics électors
vote "ACB" with Condorcet. Then we go to a cycle and anything
can happen depending of the tie breaker we choose. This is not
"academic", this reflect a problem that all the traditional voting
systems can't solve. I stand behind Lomax with the Median
range because it shows clearly and honestly to everyone an ambiguity which is
hidded in all other systems. This method as the avantage to
protect the vote of those who don't want to take a risk.
In reality, strategics voters vote on extreme values with median range,
just like approval, and non strategic sometime vote on the medians ones.
In fact, the result is that the non-strategic and undecided voters finally
decide for the strategic and clearly oriented ones. This is not what democracy is about? Certainly, voting a median
value is just like playing lotto, but it
reflect perfectly the undecision of the voter, and the
aberrations of the voting systems in general. Believe it or not, all
the math Phd are at the same level than kids with lotto ! And the
"wrong vote" of the both side normalize the aberrations. That's why I believe that this system is the best one.
When you are expressing a preference like ABC, in
reality, you are doing that after evaluating all the options one on one.
Translating an individual evaluation in terms of a static preference order
produce a distorsion. So there is no possibility of "perfectly good methods" which
can be found from ballots that do no reflect as well the voter
intention. That's because of that fondamental aberration that
strategics voters exist, because they are trying to find an advantage
on that distorsion.
The only way we
could maybe find better is a Condorcet method which produce random winners in
case of cycle. This is in fact what the SARVO system of Mr. Smith is
arguing for with range voting. But I think that the best random system can be
find from the free and unpredictable action of the people themselves, just
like the median range do, and not by a stupid machine.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 1:45
AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Linear Spread Median
Range Voting
On 12/20/05, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
At
07:48 PM 12/20/2005, rob brown wrote:
>I like this way better than
"regular" range voting, as it removes a
>large part of the incentive
people have to vote insincerely.
>
>Still, a voter has to take a
guess as to what vote will be most
>effective in helping to achieve
what he wants. Example: I vote A:
>0, B: 55, C:
100.
>
>Then the final score comes out to be A: 56.001, B: 56,
C: 45.
>Oops, my vote of 55 for B actually lowered his score, and
in this
>very tight race may have actually cost him the
election.
Not exactly. Yes, the vote for B lowered the median by a
tiny
fraction, but, unless this was quite a small town, probably not
as
much as .001.
Well, that is the nature of elections that your vote only moves the
result a small amount. The point is, it moved it in the wrong
direction.
Your vote for B lowered his score when you would have wanted
to raise his score (had you known that it was A, and not C, that was his main
competitor). The reason I had them differ by a small amount was to show
the case where the election could be lost by one vote. But of course
that's not the point. You don't know whether your vote will help or hurt
your candidate. Why do it that way when condorcet and especially DSV
methods allow you to be absolutely honest, and always* have it work in your
favor?
*ok not always. But the exceptions are so rare they are
academic.
You
would presumably know enough to know that A was roughly as
popular as B.
(This is a *really* close election, they are not all
that common.) You'd
probably have seen polls that A and B were going
to get in the range of
the mid-fifties. So you did cut it close
rating B as 55, if it was so
important to you that B win.
But why *should* you have to know that, when there are perfectly good
methods that don't require you know a thing other than which candidates you
like more than which?
If you have strong preferences, with
median Range -- though the
method
is not really well defined yet -- you might want to vote
nearer the
extremes, just to be safe. So your vote might have been A,
0; B: 80; C:
100.
But what if I thought it might end up between B and C, and I was
helping the one I didn't prefer?
You seem to suggest that voters will
know when an election is close between two candidates.....maybe for US
president, but what about other elections? Will this work for district
supervisor?
>Personally,
I will never get behind a method that gives a
>significant advantage
to those voters that are better at guessing
>who is likely to win,
and this method does that (as does approval).
This method does that
far less than Approval.
I'm not sure I'm convinced. Considering your much more complex
interface and additional data you have to collect, I don't think you gain much
at all over approval in that regard.
Mr.
Brown and I differ on the philosophy behind elections,
quite
significantly. In my view, the ultimate "advantage" to the
individual
voter lies in the election of a candidate who has the
broadest support.
I'm all for broad support. What I am against is methods that
require voters to be strategic and to have knowledge of the current standings
of the candidates for their votes to have the most impact.
Especially
when this problem has been solved by other methods.
-rob
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