Dear Forest! You wrote: > I wonder how Bucklin would fare in your simulations?
I will be able to do further simulations on Monday. > Or how about > the quartile variation of Bucklin in which the "bar" is lowered > simultaneously on the range style ballots until at least one > candidate is rated above the bar on at least 75 percent of the > ballots. My immediate guess is that it will perform somewhere between Approval and Range Voting. > If this yields more than one winner, then eliminate winners > by random ballot until there is only one left. This is unlikely in my simulation setting since the ratings are real numbers and candidates' and voters' positions are drawn from a standard normal distribution. (By the way, should I use a different distribution ?) > I like Liberal Fair Choice (LFC). It works well in the example that > Kevin Venzke always worried about: > > 49 C > 24 B (but sincere is B>A>C) > 27 A>B>>C > > No candidate is strongly defeated since the approval order is B>C>A, > but more than 51/2 voters prefer C to B, and more than 51/2 prefer A > to B, and more than 49/2 prefer A to C. > So the winner is chosen by random ballot. Right. And had the 24 voted B>>A>C or B>A>>C instead, the solution would be the same. > What if we modified LFC by using MinOf2 to pick the winner from among > the candidates that are not strongly defeated? Interesting. But although that might increase the performance in terms of social welfare still a bit further, I doubt that it is worth the effort since MinOf2 requires range-style ballots while LFC requires only rankings with approval cutoffs! > Or how about going beyond Gini by using MinOf3, By which you mean: draw 3 ballots at random and elect the candidate whose minimum range value on these ballots is largest? > or by using MinOf(K) > for the largest K that distinguishes a winner, Here I don't understand what you mean by "distinguish a winner"... > i.e. using random > ballot to eliminate all but one candidate? Do you mean: draw ballots at random and each time eliminate the lowest-ranked candidate until only one remains? > Could we modify LFC for the multiwinner case by relaxing the > definition of "strongly defeated" appropriately? Perhaps, but I must say that I never thought about multi-winner methods thoroughly. My impression is that for electing a multi-seat representative body, something like Delegable Proxy would be my choice. Yours, Jobst ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
