In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (on 27 August 2006 10:38:16 EDT), [EMAIL PROTECTED] ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: >What is most lacking in this and other discussions >on this list about strategic voting is empirical data about >how people vote in actual public elections in which different >voting methods are used.
See http://www.RangeVoting.org/rangeVborda.html#kiribati for a discussion of DH3 in a real-life, public Borda election (in Kiribati, a Pacific Island state). (Also noted is a more local example, at http://www.RangeVoting.org/rangeVborda.html#bossbulb.) I am not personally convinced that Condorcet _with an appropriate completion mechanism, one not vulnerable to DH3 pathology (approval being the easiest to implement IMO, but I'd be interested in seeing a range voting version of that) in case of cycles_ would be vulnerable in any realistic case, but Warren is correct to point out the problem as a serious one. -Allen -- Allen Smith http://cesario.rutgers.edu/easmith/ There is only one sound argument for democracy, and that is the argument that it is a crime for any man to hold himself out as better than other men, and, above all, a most heinous offense for him to prove it. - H. L. Mencken ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
