My objection was to Warren's rhetoric. To say the problem is a "serious" one is one thing. To say, as Warren did, that it is a particularly worrisome "pathology" with the potential to cause "massive destruction" is a very different thing. Also, lumping Condorcet in with Borda is pretty outrageous. Nearly everyone agrees that Borda has major vulnerabilities regarding strategic voting that far outweigh any effects the DH3 problem may have.
As far as empirical data about actual public elections in which different voting methods are used, it's true that there is a lot of data regarding one method, IRV, and small amounts regarding a few others, but there is none that I know of regarding any versions of Condorcet and few if any regarding range voting. Even most of the data regarding approval voting is with organizational elections, not public elections. -Ralph Suter In a message dated 8/27/06 11:59:17 AM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << [EMAIL PROTECTED] ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: >What is most lacking in this and other discussions >on this list about strategic voting is empirical data about >how people vote in actual public elections in which different >voting methods are used. See http://www.RangeVoting.org/rangeVborda.html#kiribati for a discussion of DH3 in a real-life, public Borda election (in Kiribati, a Pacific Island state). (Also noted is a more local example, at http://www.RangeVoting.org/rangeVborda.html#bossbulb.) I am not personally convinced that Condorcet _with an appropriate completion mechanism, one not vulnerable to DH3 pathology (approval being the easiest to implement IMO, but I'd be interested in seeing a range voting version of that) in case of cycles_ would be vulnerable in any realistic case, but Warren is correct to point out the problem as a serious one. >> ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
