On the Range Voting list, there has been an interesting discussion of the philosophy behind Range Voting vs preference-based methods (such as those satisfying the Condorcet Criterion and the Majority Criterion).
From Wikipedia: >The majority criterion is a ><http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion>voting system >criterion, used to objectively compare ><http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system>voting systems. The >criterion states that if a majority of voters strictly prefers a >given candidate to every other candidate (i.e. the given candidate >is the first preference of more than half the voters) and they vote >sincerely, then that candidate should win. I should really touch that article, for the term "objectively," while technically correct, implies something that is not true: that systems which satisfy the majority criterion are superior to those which do not. The problem with the majority criterion is that it entirely neglects strength of preference. Warren Smith, in his writing about Range Voting, has pointed this out: for some voters, the choice may be a matter of life and death, and for others, it may be a mere preference, or even no preference at all, the voter tossed a coin.... If a group of people for some reason can only order one kind of pizza, how can they choose which kind? Range Voting, where each person votes a numerical value for each choice, Warren prefers systems that are 0-99, but technically Range includes systems all the way from Approval Voting (value integers from zero to one) to even more refined systems, such as one where, in comparing items, the voter may assign any number and then the scores are normalized so that the highest vote given reduces to the maximum in whatever system is used to compile the votes. For some people, whether or not they choose pepperoni may be only a matter of whim, they like some of the other choices just as well, though maybe that particular day they have a preference. For others it may be very, very important: pepperoni may make them ill or may be religiously prohibited. If you care about the group welfare, Range Voting essentially maximizes group satisfaction. The Majority Criterion, I could show, also causes the voting system to devalue, effectively, the votes of knowledgeable voters, making them equal to those of those who are not knowledgeable. While we often think of strong opinions as representing fanaticism, the fact is that those who are knowledgeable about a subject are likely to have much stronger opinions about it -- so strong that their opinions may even be admitted as evidence, "expert opinion," -- than those who are not informed. When the uninformed have strong opinions, we would hope that these opinions could be given less weight, but I see no way to do this without violating the basic criteria of democracy; however, a rational system would at least allow voters to indicate how strong their preferences are. And if the voting system takes into account strength of preference, it does not satisfy the majority criterion. A proposal has been made that if a Range poll shows a different winner, by summation of votes, than would be indicated through preference analysis -- which is easy to do with Range votes -- then there would be a ratification poll. Thus the Range winner would never be imposed on a majority, and the overall system would, indeed, satisfy the intention behind the Majority Criterion. The Condorcet winner could, quite easily, not be the winner who would maximize social satisfaction with the result.... ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
