Hi, --- David Cary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > If some want to throw out the Majority Criterion in favor of > something better, then both the "something" and the "better" deserve > some scrutiny. For example, here are some questions: > > 1. If the Majority Criterion gets repudiated because it is > inconsistent with Range Voting, why is it that we know that Range > Voting is better? Is there a replacement criterion, or is Range > Voting just being declared self-evident perfection?
Hmm... A couple of years ago I posted results of simulations to compare sincerely-voted Schulze elections with Approval elections (using various types of sincerity and strategy). These led me to drop social utility as an argument in favor of Approval, as I didn't find a (realistic) Approval strategy that clearly outperformed Schulze. Approval did seem to clearly outperform sincere Schulze when the voters knew the identity of sincere SU maximizing candidate, believed this candidate to have a 90% chance of winning (the other 10% evenly distributed among other candidates), and then voted using "better than expectation" strategy. With 5 and 7 candidates, Approval picked a better candidate 25% and 31% of the time, and a worse candidate under 5% of the time. This doesn't seem like a realistic scenario in a public election though. If you care to look at my original post, it is here: http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-March/012292.html Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Yahoo! Mail réinvente le mail ! Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail et son interface révolutionnaire. http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
