On Dec 18, 2006, at 8:31 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > How did we get here? > > You talk of a method in which ONE voter can say BOTH A>B AND B>A. > Yes, either in the sense that both lose to each others or in the sense that both win each others.
> Assuming such a method could claim useful value to justify the > headaches of implementing it and making it understood, I have seen > nothing to suggest Condorcet might have such an ability. See e.g. http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Tied_at_the_top_rule. The reason I discussed this possibility is the fact that it frees the voter from creating an artificial loop and deciding in which direction it should run. > In Condorcet the sum of all the ballots in an election can be a > combination of some voters voting each preference in a way to, > collectively, create a cycle - a problem to solve but not a feature > to brag about. > Agreed. The tied at top/bottom rules are tricks that may relieve this a bit. (Their other characteristics would need to be discussed more to tell if they are good or bad in general.) > You also use the word "loops" in a manner I do not understand. > I don't know how but I think I referred to artificial intentionally generated circular preferences every time. Juho Laatu > DWK > > On Sun, 17 Dec 2006 21:40:02 +0200 Juho wrote: >> I thought mostly use scenarios where the favourite candidate is >> not involved in the cycles and the voters know very little about >> the anticipated results. Another example in this direction would >> be situation where there are n parties that each have 3 >> candidates. Voters would then vote so that they first put their >> own candidates in the front (in some order (ffs)) and then the >> other parties in the order of preference but arranging the >> individual candidates within the parties so that they will form >> cycles (between each others within the parties). >> Note btw that this failure of FAVS (as Warren Smith named it) is >> not really related to the calculation process of the Condorcet >> methods but to the ballot style. In the typical ballots voters >> give the candidates a linear order, which prevents them giving >> cyclic preferences. If they were able to give cyclic preferences >> then all voters could vote the same way. >> In principle (to be general) one could allow voters to fill a >> matrix instead of giving a linear order. This would make it >> possible to use also cycles and all kind of partial orderings. A >> related topic is the tied at the top and tied at the bottom rules >> where the top candidates may all win each others (or at the >> bottom lose to each others). Support of the tied at bottom >> feature would make it unnecessary to vote loops since this way >> all unwanted candidates would lose to each others. This feature >> could also be added in the "matrix preference votes" to eliminate >> some strategic loop considerations. >> Also the linear order based ballots could have explicit ways to >> mark "both lose" and "both win" etc. (instead of the default >> rules "tied at top",...), but of course this makes voting more >> complex to the voters (just like allowing full matrix preference >> votes would do). Using "+" and "-" a ballot might look e.g. a >> +b>c=d>e-f>g-h-i. >> Just for your consideration. Different ballot styles may have an >> impact on strategies too. >> Juho Laatu >> On Dec 15, 2006, at 15:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote: >>> How did we get here? >>> >>> I assume no ties to simplify the discussion - not to change the >>> rules. >>> >>> If there is a cycle, such as X>A>Y>X, A backers have no control >>> as to X>A, but they can influence whether there is also a Y>X >>> to create a cycle. >>> >>> Else, assuming more voters back X than A, A loses and it matters >>> not what ordering A backers choose for others. >>> >>> If there is no such X, A wins and it matters not how A backers >>> sort those losing to A. >>> >>> LOOKING CLOSER - If A backers want to be neutral as to B/C/D, >>> they can simply vote for A as they would in Plurality. >>> >>> On Fri, 15 Dec 2006 00:01:04 +0200 Juho wrote: >>> >>>> Here is one very basic case where a group of voters has >>>> identical preferences but they benefit of casting three >>>> different kind of ballots. >>>> In a Condorcet method there is an interest to create a loop to >>>> your opponents. In its simplest form there are four >>>> candidates. One of the candidates is our favourite and the >>>> others we want to beat. The others may or may not be from one >>>> party (this influences the probability of being able to >>>> generate a cycle at least if there are more than 4 >>>> candidates). Let's anyway assume that all the candidates will >>>> get about the same number of votes. Also in a zero info >>>> situation this may be a good voting strategy. The A supporters >>>> vote according to three patterns as follows. >>>> A>B>C>D >>>> A>C>D>B >>>> A>D>B>C >>>> If all candidates have same number of first place supporters >>>> (and other preferences are mixed) and B, C and D supporters >>>> don't try to create loops, A wins. >>>> Juho Laatu > -- > [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek > Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 > Do to no one what you would not want done to you. > If you want peace, work for justice. > > Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
