I know about open party list - though it offers more control, it still offers less than candidate-based methods - and would be too rigid. The same goes for asset voting - possibly even more so.
A computer count is not a problem - all voting is already done on computer anyway. Thus, I definitely think either STV or some kind of proportional approval or range voting would seem to be the best options for multi-winner. I don't think the fact that STV was eliminated before is a huge issue - as it was 20 years ago... They did cite monotonicity as one of their reasons in their minutes, though... Does anyone have other suggestions? If STV were to be used, what rules would be best? I'd like to not make it too complex with things like Meek, CPO-STV, et al, but work fairly well. Also, how should the single winner case be handled? Also, what preferential methods exist that satisfy "later no harm"? I think that students, more than others, tend to "bullet vote" - and this may be a consideration. I know range, Borda, et al don't satisfy it, and IRV/STV do (they fail monotonicity, though). Is IRV the best there is for single-winner than satisfies later-no-harm? Is STV for multi-winner? Could one look for a Condorcet winner (in single-winner) and then fall back on IRV if none exists without violating LNH? On 12/21/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Anyway, I have been investigating alternate systems for single-winner
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